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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy Systems at the International 
Hellenic University.  
This paper is dedicated to the effort to introduce and explain the European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme as the system that was adopted by the EU members-states and an 
additional three non-EU countries, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, with the com-
mitment to reduce CO2 and Greenhouse Gases emissions. The EU ETS was formed for 
Europe to comply with the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of harmful atmospheric 
gases by the year 2020. In the paper environmental imperatives for cleaner industries 
are examined. Simultaneously, the financial impediments, prohibitions and benefits are 
also related as they are incentives for the switch to clean energy sources. 
A significant part of the paper is particularly dedicated to the analysis of the Greek case, 
as Greece has also participated in the EU ETS since the trial phase that began in 2005. 
Greece is not among the pioneer-participants in the Emissions Trading Scheme, but nei-
ther lags behind the other European countries. Policy adjustments have already taken 
place in our country, with the installation of natural gas pipelines in most major Greek 
cities. More adjustments are required for Greece to reach compliance with the Kyoto 
Protocol till 2020. Most efforts have so far reported success from various European and 
USA sources in all countries and further planning is continuously taking place for Eu-
rope to become the first large-scale implementer of an emissions scheme. 
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1 Introduction 
In the past few decades there is increasing pressure by environmental groups to gov-
ernments mostly in developed countries to regulate heavily the polluting practices they 
have been used ever since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. It can no longer 
be denied that the consumption of tremendous amounts of fossil fuels for all activities 
of mankind, although driven from immediate needs of the populations originally, have 
been greatly misused and abused for profit as well. Fighting this trend that by the end of 
the 20
th
 century had become the driving force of the markets, ecologists and environ-
mentalists have been tirelessly looking for ways to implement greener technologies in 
industries and everyday life practices. At the same time they have been bombarding 
governments with data that has finally in the 21
st
 century drawn enough attention and 
brought governments to action on environmental preservation matters. Despite the fact 
that there is still considerable resistance from a large number of countries, steps have 
been taken especially in Australia and in Europe to make governments and peoples 
aware both of the problems and problematic practices, as well as recuperating plans and 
actions. These actions are mostly addressed to clusters of nations and countries such as 
the EU who since 2005 has become “a frontrunner in implementing emission reduction 
targets” (Zhang & Wei, 2010). To do that a policy was designed to reduce CO2 emis-
sions, under the name European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, abbreviated to EU 
ETS.  
The purpose of this paper is to briefly introduce the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme and the rules and responsibilities it allocates to the companies in EU in order to 
reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020 (Ares, 2012). It also aims to describe the EU 
ETS and the way it functions, regulates and assists the industry to become a greener 
sector to what it has been. To do that there is going to follow a short literature review on 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.  
Specifically Chapter 2 provides an insight on the way that the EU ETS operates. This 
chapter is devoted to explaining the three phases in which the EU-ETS is divided. Ac-
cording to the EU ETS’s official webpage, the scheme is organized in three periods that 
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address the change of companies’ policies on emissions towards greener practices pro-
gressively (online source
1).  These periods are analysed as follows: “Phase 1” trading 
period starting from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007. It has aimed to successfully 
secure a cost for carbon, free trade in emission allowances across the EU and the signif-
icant framework for overseeing, reporting and verifying exact emissions from all partic-
ipating businesses. The second, “Phase 2”, trading period started in January 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2012. This is the first implementation period for the Kyoto Protocol. Fi-
nally there is a third phase commencing on January 1, 2013 and completing on Decem-
ber 31, 2020. This is the longest trading period of the three. By the end of 2020 it is 
planned that all industrial sectors are included in the Emissions Trading Scheme. The 
target is for the EU ETS to regulate prices and trading of carbon in Europe in an innova-
tive way enforcing all industrial sectors to join in the battle against climate change. 
Due of the most important new element in phase 3, is the move from grandfathering to 
auctioning of emissions permits. That is, after January 2013, most of the firms will have 
to purchase the total amount of permits they need. This raises the question of the signif-
icance of permits’ cost for Greek firms. This is the main research question of the present 
dissertation. 
In Chapter 3 the methodology is used to answer the research question. This is followed 
by data analysis and comparison of the empirical results that have been achieved in 
Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS. The data will be used to present and explain the fluctua-
tions in the allowance price during the first two phases. The price will then be used to 
calculate the cost of emissions in the energy sector in Greece particularly. In this chap-
ter an attempt is also included to predict and give an estimation of the cost of allowance 
prices for the Greek energy sector during the coming third phase of the EU-ETS. 
Chapter 4 will present the results of the research, the overall conclusions and will also 
offer some policy recommendations, especially for the Greek energy sector for the next 
period.  
Chapter 5 entails the concluding, predictory comments that are drawn from the present 
research and sets some important questions for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
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2 Describing EU ETS 
The EU-ETS is a cap and trade scheme, (system or mechanism) which aims to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in Europe (Zhang & Wei, 2010; Ares, 2012; Guðbrandsdóttir 
& Haraldsson, 2011; House of Commons, 2012; online sources
2
). Before engaging to 
the description of the Emissions Trading Scheme of the European Union, it is necessary 
to explain how cap-and-trade systems work in the effort to reduce EU CO2 emissions.  
As the need of reducing air pollution has become imminent and un-postponealbe and 
the dangers of the planet overheating are becoming ever more evident measures are 
called to be taken for this situation to change radically and immediately. The answer to 
the problem appears to be a system that once put together it has the potential to help in-
dividual companies manage their carbon dioxide emissions effectively, so that the car-
bon tax payments decrease. The cap-and-trade system can be described briefly as fol-
lows: The environmental regulator first sets a cap to the amount of CO2 that each com-
pany is allowed to release in the atmosphere. Then it distributes to each firm an amount 
of emission permits equal to each firm’s cap, allowing firms to trade emission permits 
among them. However, for some firms it is easier to manage their emissions and be well 
under the cap set (online source)
3
. In this case such companies have an excess amount 
of greenhouse emissions permits to trade in the permits market. what the environmental 
regulator is interested in is that the total amount of GHGs released in the atmosphere 
annually does not exceed the overall cap set.  
The EU-ETS is a cap and trade system for CO2 emissions. Zhang and Wei (2010) spe-
cifically write of “governments [that] have begun to get moving on mitigating global 
warming” via markets that have emerged for the trading of GHGs and carbon making 
money in the process of “different economies agree[ing] to take common but differenti-
ated obligations” in “a tradable green certificate system” (Rathmann, 2007). Part of the 
EU ETS responsibilities is to regulate those markets and to control that all actions in-
volved in these schemes and the participating countries and governments are complying 
with EU regulations. “Under this circumstance, carbon trading market has provided new 
commercial opportunities” (Zhang & Wei, 2010). 
                                                 
2
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Emission_Trading_Scheme 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm 
3
 http://www.ecomii.com/ecopedia/cap-and-trade 
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What is traded, essentially, is the allowance of emitting one ton of CO2 from one com-
pany that has not reached its cap, to another company that has exceeded its correspond-
ing cap (Keppler & Mansanet-Bataller, 2010). A question that may arise at this point is 
why such a system hasn’t been implemented earlier either nationally or Europe-wide. 
Global summit meetings on environmental matters have been taking place since the 
mid-90s. Egenhofer offers an explanation. A cap-and-trade system is literally a system 
that allows certain volumes of emission to happen, which is seen by the public as “li-
cense to pollute” (Egenhofer, 2007). However, the Kyoto Protocol made the implemen-
tation of a cap-and-trade system mandatory, so as the emissions volumes could be both 
controlled and better handled.  
The EU ETS is based on the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) developed in each par-
ticipating country. By definition the NAPs concern each country individually and are 
based on a national emission cap that the EU approves for each country-participant in 
the emissions trading system. “Those countries then allocate allowances to their indus-
trial operators, and track and validate the actual emissions in accordance with the rele-
vant assigned amount” (online source4). Then the governing body of the trading system, 
the state official body or government, allocates the allowances to its respective industri-
al units that fall within the cap’s industrial sectors, such as power plants and heavy in-
dustry. The trading of the allowances can then happen in three distinct levels: either pri-
vately from one installation of the same company to another even beyond national bor-
ders, or over-the-counter, by engaging a broker to bring the two parties of the transac-
tion in contact or, finally, “trading on the spot market of one of Europe's climate ex-
changes” (online source -4-). 
The procedure for the countries participating in the EU ETS has been characterized as 
decentralized in comparison to the emissions trading systems in the US, because each 
country has had to submit its own National Allocation Plan rather than follow a central 
plan compiled by the EU environmental committee (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008). Alt-
hough countries can design their own allocation plans, the EU central authority has to 
approve each country’s plan before their implementation. In the official webpage of the 
EU ETS it is clearly stated that some countries NAPs have been rejected on account of 
either governments failing to implement the system in its proper form, or having over-
allocated the allowances available to them. In such case the member-state is held under 
                                                 
4
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Emission_Trading_Scheme 
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the obligation to re-submit a NAP either completely reformed or remedied (online 
source
5
) 
The ETS’s first phase was a pilot period within which the cap was set permits were al-
located and traded partially experimentally. The 15 countries-members had to submit 
their NAPs by March 31
st
, 2004, whereas the remaining ten countries had an extension 
untill May 1
st
 of the same year. What is interesting in the reports of the European Com-
mission is that all of the countries’ NAPs had to be re-designed or remedied and the first 
plans were finally accepted on July 7, 2004 for the UK, Sweden, Slovenia, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Germany (online source
6
). The rest of the countries-
members’ plans were finally accepted over a period of almost twelve months, with Po-
land, the Czech Republic, Italy and Greece having their NAPs approved of after the 
start date of Phase 1; Greece was the last country to receive approval of its NAP (online 
source -6-). The European Commission imposed a rule that regulated the procedures of 
submitting the NAPs. There were certain guidelines that the countries had to follow in 
order for their NAPs to be finally accepted. The shortcomings of the NAPs were identi-
fied in three categories: one concerned that the Kyoto Protocol was not met, another if 
there were inconsistencies between the volumes of allowances and the Kyoto target and 
a third if a NAP included the state’s intervening after the system had been imposed 
(online source -6-). The Kyoto Protocol is binding for the EU countries-members, so 
they are responsible for reducing their GHG emissions by 5% relative to the 1990 emis-
sions (Guðbrandsdóttir & Haraldsson, 2011). In the case that a NAP had to be rede-
signed from scratch, it had to be submitted again, so that the Commission would ap-
prove it anew. There were, however, those plans that only needed adjustments and in 
this case if the state followed the suggestions of the European commission to the letter, 
the NAP did not need to be re-submitted to the commission (online source -5-). 
In January 2008 Phase 2 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme began with the commit-
ment on the part of the EU to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Phase 2, also known as 
the Kyoto commitment period, ends in December 2012. Despite the fact that Phase 2 
coincides with the first Kyoto commitment period (2008 – 2012), it is simultaneously 
independent of it. As Ellerman and Joskow put it, the EU ETS “was enacted before the 
Kyoto Protocol became legally binding in international and EU law and it would have 
                                                 
5
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/index_en.htm 
6
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/2005/index_en.htm 
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become operational even if the Kyoto Protocol had not entered into force” (Ellerman 
and Joskow 2008). This second phase is similar to the first phase in the view that all the 
countries remain under the commitment to trade CO2 emissions as well as for being 
compelled to submit new NAPs as in Phase 1. At the same time Phase 2 is essentially 
different to the first phase as there are now 30 participating countries relative to the 
original 15 in the first phase (Table 1). Also there is the potential for countries to com-
pile NAPs for gases other than CO2 although this is not mandatory for this second 
phase. Already the Netherlands have taken a first step in Phase 2 and inserted the trad-
ing of NO2 besides CO2 (Ramakrishnan, 2008). Finally, the most prominent feature of 
Phase 2 is the fact that the flexibility mechanisms designed in the Kyoto Protocol have 
been implemented. The two mechanisms in question are the Joint Implementation and 
the Clean Development Mechanism which “[allow] companies in the second trading 
period to use credits […] up to a certain proportion of their allocation of emission al-
lowances, to cover their emissions” (Ramakrishnan, 2008). According to the EU ETS 
official page, the NAPs carry the regulatory responsibility for the use of JI and CDM 
and it is also possible that credits not used in the period from 2008 to 2012 can be trans-
ferred to the next period (online source
7
). Table 1 summarises the phases of the EU 
ETS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/index_en.htm 
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Table 1: Phases of the EU ETS Source8 
 
Not unsurprisingly there is nothing notable in the submitting of the NAPs for the second 
period. Countries-members were obliged to submit their NAPs for the second phase a 
year and a half earlier to the start date and taking advantage of the experience of Phase 1 
this procedure happened smoothly. This was one of the valuable lessons learned from 
the first period. In comparison to the period of 2005-2007, the NAPs had been expected 
to be completed and submitted half a year earlier. In Phase 2 the period elapsing before 
the start date was tripled, so that no country would lag behind again. Realising that the 
compilation of a NAP is a time-consuming process, the European Commission activated 
the compilation process in June 2006 (online source
9
). Another lesson learned from the 
NAPs of 2005-2007 was that the plans ought to become simplified in order to be opera-
tional. The shortcoming of the NAPs of the first period was that they were “not suffi-
ciently transparent” perhaps exactly because of their complexity (online source -8-).  
                                                 
8
 
http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/lcgg/documents/roadmap/case_study_fact_sheets/Case%20Stu
dies/CS-European%20Union's%20Emissions%20Trading%20System.pdf 
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/2008/index_en.htm 
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As the first phase has been considered overall successful in implementing an emissions 
trading system in several countries and across several sectors, in the second phase, the 
European Commission has aspired to include the aviation industry in the scheme. As 
from January of the current year aviation companies have had to participate in the CO2 
trading as they are also major pollutants of the atmosphere. The EU regulations for avia-
tors are strict to the point that they enforce ETS compliance to both airlines founded in 
the participating countries-members and outside of them. The criterion is where the 
flight takes off from or where it lands (online source
10
). That means that regardless to 
which country the airline belongs to, upon landing or taking off from an ETS-country, it 
is obliged to conform to the CO2 cap imposed. One illustrative example that the ETS 
webpage provides for the public to realize the magnitude of atmospheric pollution by 
flying to and from a destination is that a flight from London to New York and back will 
generate per person an amount of CO2 equal to that generated by heating up a home for 
a year on average (online source -9-). However, there are exceptions to this strict rule 
that apply to those countries outside the EU ETS, or Europe altogether, who have them-
selves undertaken tenacious schemes for reducing their carbon emissions (online source 
-9-). The implementation of the aviation industry in the ETS is a positive movement 
more than people may realize. As air-travel has become commonplace and the competi-
tiveness of the airline market has made air-tickets affordable to a large number of trav-
elers, the amount of air-traveling can no longer be considered as a minor factor of the 
GHG emissions. Not only that but overall the layman is relieved from the burden of 
conforming to a cap for GHG emissions on an individual level which means that we, as 
European citizens, continue to fly to and from our destinations guilt free. If the airline is 
forced to take on that responsibility on the behalf of the passengers then it should be ex-
pected that either CO2 policies will change by trading allowances to meet the cap or that 
motivation will be enhanced towards greener technologies.    
In Phase 1 the countries-members that participated were 15 and the industrial sectors 
were mainly the heavy consumers of energy that are also the heavy emitters of CO2. 
These sectors include electricity plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants, 
minerals, pulp and paper industry as seen also in Graph 2 (below) and Table 1 (above). 
The second phase has been crowned with success because to the original 15 countries 
another twelve have been added within the EU and an additional three – Norway, Ice-
                                                 
10
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm 
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land and Lichtenstein – which make up the total of 30 countries. The industrial sectors 
that hold an obligation under the cap are the same as in the first phase. Before the expi-
ration of the second phase in the beginning of 2012 the aviation industry has also been 
included under the cap. American researchers who have had longer experience in the 
cap-and-trade system since it has been implemented in their government policies since 
the 1970s, claim that the EU effort to comply with the Kyoto Protocol on emissions has 
been optimistically successful (Egenhofer, 2007; Ellerman & Joskow, 2008).  
“No one talks about under-performance in Europe since 2005 because of 
the carbon price. Changes have occurred in certain industries, but the no-
tion that the carbon price would wreck the overall economy is clearly 
disproved for the European system, which for a long time had a high 
price compared to what was expected”. (Ellerman quoted in Ramakrish-
nan, 2008)     
2.1 EU ETS Phase 3 – The Future 
Entering Phase 3 in January 2013 changes are imminent in the way the ETS works. Up 
until now the countries were expected to compile a National Allocation Plan for meet-
ing the cap demands according to the Kyoto Protocol. However, this form of planning 
the carbon market is moving towards a more centralized mechanism. Reports in the lit-
erature describe a plan that will emanate from the European Commission directly and 
not on a national level (Ramakrishnan, 2008; McKenna, 2009). Other significant steps 
forward have also been charted. One of them is that more greenhouse gases beyond CO2 
will be included in the trading market and thus more industrial sectors will come under 
the umbrella of the cap (online source
11
). Finally, the beacon of the third phase is the 
mapping of the reduction of GHG emissions by 1,74% each year from 2013 onwards 
(online source -11-). If the first period was characterized as a trial, the second was a 
preparatory period for benchmarking to reach Phase 3 with all countries-members ready 
to fully implement the ETS in their respective markets and beyond. In the previous two 
phases most allocations were given freely; embarking on 2013, though, member-states 
are expected to auction more than half the allocations accredited to them. Although the 
third phase has an expiration date, this means either that a new fourth phase has yet to 
                                                 
11
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/index_en.htm 
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be set in motion or that the European Commission is optimistic that Phase 3 will set a 
rhythm for emissions reduction that will continue so forth.  
2.2 Forces Influencing the CO2 market  
Technically, the countries participating in the Emissions Trading Scheme have certain 
obligations. In April of every year each operator is under the obligation to compile evi-
dence that either the cap has been met but not exceeded or that allowances have been 
bought to cover the excess of CO2 emissions. In Phase 1, which ended in December 
2007, there was the first crush of the emissions trading price. By 2006, the system 
seemed to work out smoothly, mostly due to the cap being “set rather generously” and 
hence prices were expected to be rather low (Hintermann, 2010). The setting up of such 
a market is tenacious enough for one country let alone for a cluster of countries. There-
fore, there are a lot of different forces shaping the emissions trading market that need to 
be understood before it can safely be said that balance has been achieved. Both Ares 
(2012) and Hintermann (2010) report prices beginning from as low as 7€ per ton of CO2 
in 2005 soaring to over 30€ in 2006 and crushing to a staggering “few cents” by the end 
period in 2007. As we are coming closer to the end of Phase two, it is obvious that both 
the governing body of the ETS as well as the companies have become wiser as to the 
prices of trading carbon dioxide allowances. In retrospect of the first phase of the emis-
sions trading system, economists have assessed the variables in play for the crushing 
market of 2007 and are talking about prices that will allow the carbon dioxide allow-
ances to become both a viable and competitive investment for the parties taking part in 
the transaction.  
As part of a greater business scheme, the price of carbon is as much subject to the mar-
ket of forces as any other goods being traded. However, in the seven years that the EU 
ETS has been in action the fluctuation of trading prices has been tremendous thus in-
creasing insecurity among businesses and governments (Ares, 2012). Graph 1 shows the 
prices for carbon from January 2005 to June 2010 and it is evident that during the first 
three years – Phase 1 – the prices paid were extremely volatile (Ares, 2012). The second 
graph is an account of the carbon emissions and coverage of carbon allowances under 
the Emissions Trading Scheme (Hintermann, 2010). Analyzing the two graphs in a par-
allel way, it is obvious that the trading system worked on one hand, on the other, how-
ever, perhaps it worked too well as by the end of 2007 the allocation of allowances had 
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covered almost all needs to the point that the prices for GHG allowances were close to 
zero. The smooth collapse of the price is due to the fact that allowances issued in Phase 
1 could not be transferred in Phase 2. Thus, their value was zero by the end of 2007. 
During the second phase lessons from Phase 1 were very useful in directing firms’ be-
haviour so that price of allowances was more stable ranging from 17€ to 29€ (Ares, 
2012). Blyth and Bunn (2011) argue that up to a point this fluctuation is not unnatural. 
In fact they claim that “[a]lthough carbon prices are ultimately institutional artefacts and 
therefore policy risk is foundational”, however “market-based mechanisms with quanti-
ty targets are chosen to promote efficiency in price discovery and innovation in the 
management of risks by the private sector in ways that policy-makers cannot fully antic-
ipate” (Blyth & Bunn, 2011). At the same time Ares and other analysts toll the bell for 
the need of a standard lower price for carbon that is indicative of a viable investment 
plan (Ares, 2012; Blyth & Bunn, 2011) 
 
                               Graph 1: Prices Fluctuations during Phases 1 & 2 , Source: (Ares, 2012) 
-20- 
 
Graph 2: Emissions and allocations for 2006 divided by sector Source: (Hintermann, 2007) 
Graph 2 presents both the allocation of emission permits and the actual emissions by 
sector in 2006. It is evident that the only sector with an allowance deficit was the power 
and heat sector, while the rest of the sectors had surpluses. 
What is also interesting in Graph 2 is that the power and heat industry is the major con-
tributor of CO2 in the atmosphere and therefore a massive factor that influences the 
prices of the allowances in the EU trading system. There are many studies attempting to 
explain how the ETS is influenced by the power sector. Also a lot of effort has been 
made in explaining both how the electricity market works and how differentiated solu-
tions such as the renewable sources of energy as well as unpredictable factors such as 
the weather influence the price of allowances for GHG emissions. There are several 
links made between such factors and the prices for carbon in the EU and the influence is 
admittedly both positive and negative. 
For instance, Rathmann (2007), in his research on the shaping of market prices, takes 
renewable energy sources into consideration and explains how using such alternative 
energy sources affects both the emissions of carbon dioxide from a company, as well as 
the prices of the GHG allowances that are available for trading. Considering the factors 
and forces that influence the prices for carbon dioxide allowances, in the first phase of 
the ETS, the member-states of the EU involved in the scheme allocated the allowances 
freely to the participants (Rathmann, 2007). However, from the point on that this was 
widely understood as a tradable product a price could be set according to which compa-
nies could freely allocate their allowances to the highest bidder. As the allowances in 
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the first trial phase were generous, most firms’ needs were covered and by the time the 
first year’s results were made public in mid-2006 it was obvious that there were more 
allowances available than needed, which brought the prices down on the slopping hill. 
Excusably Phase 1 was a trial phase to find out all the undercurrent forces operating in 
the system in place. 
 The logic behind the alternative energy sources’ impact on carbon prices is simple. Us-
ing a green source of energy has an immediate influence on the amount of emissions 
thus narrowing the gap between the business’s emissions and the imposed cap 
(Rathmann, 2007). Such a policy directly affects the market of carbon allowances as the 
balance between supply and demand must be unmistakably kept. At the same time the 
market of trading electricity is also immediately affected. Especially since electricity 
production from fossil fuels is a major CO2 emissions polluting factor, on the one hand 
it is evident that using renewable energy sources reduces the need for extra investment 
costs to buy allowances for emissions. On the other hand, the cost of energy production 
is reduced but so is the investment plan for allowances. Ares (2012) clearly states that 
for allowances to be an advisable investment a lower price per ton of CO2 must be set, 
otherwise the emissions trading system will neither be a motivating scheme for compa-
nies to go greener nor the relief valve that has been counted on.  
Sorrel et al. (2009) investigate the several categories of factors influencing prices of 
CO2 and also list those factors under each category as shown in picture 1. From these 
categories the paper focuses on the price variables and especially those within the box. 
One of the factors that is immediately noticed is the retail prices, that is the prices that 
people buy electricity at. As power has become a commodity that people cannot do 
without, the cost of producing energy should be taken into account. Before 2005 power-
producing companies need not have added the cost of CO2 emissions on the cost of pro-
duction. There was, however, a carbon tax. After 2005 the extra cost of buying allow-
ances ought to be added on the cost of production of energy which also affects the price 
at which consumers buy electricity as well. Common sense dictates that if the price of a 
product is too high and the consumer cannot afford it then either the consumer will stop 
consuming the product altogether or make efforts to reduce the amount required in order 
to reduce the cost of life. An investment on producing power from renewable, greener 
sources of energy influences the market in two ways: the additional cost of allowances 
is eliminated and at the same time energy reservoirs are not diminished. Normally, this 
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double strike would be expected to be followed by a reduction in electricity prices. 
However, that may not be the case as main energy production plants will still provide 
their product following a traditional line of production.   
 
Picture 1: Categorizations of factors influencing the carbon prices, Source: Sorrel et al.’s (2009) 
2.3 Overall Overview 
Concluding the literature review it is obvious that the ETS has a dual identity. On the 
one hand it is a complicated system that aims to control and regulate GHG emissions. 
On the other hand it works as a safety contraption for businesses that need to comply 
with the Kyoto Protocol on battling the overheating of the planet. Below in Picture 2 the 
yearly obligations of each country-member within the ETS are depicted in a circular 
timeline. This cannot but make sense as the effort for reducing carbon emissions is a 
continuous process. Taking a closer look at the year-round obligations, each phase be-
gins on the 1
st
 of January and is followed by compiling and submitting the country’s 
previous year’s report by the end of March. On April 30th the allowances are surren-
dered and the planning for the next phase’s NAP is completed in June. Although the 
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aviation industry has only lately been included in the ETS, the same yearly planning 
applies to airline companies as well. However, as Phase 3 sees changes in the way the 
allocation plans will be submitted, this yearly plan is also expected to be changed.  
 
                  Picture 2: Yearly obligations for operators within the EU ETS (Source: McKenna, 2009) 
The following three figures illustrate the percentages of allowances that have either 
been allocated freely or have been auctioned in each of the three phases of the EU-ETS. 
From these charts (Figures 1, 2, 3) it is obvious that the percentage that is provided 
freely to the operators diminishes in every consecutive period. In Phase 1 only 5% of 
the allowances were auctioned, a percentage that doubles in Phase 2 and is expected to 
be a dozen times higher for Phase 3. This gradual shift towards auctioning is in compli-
ance to making the carbon market a competitive one for investments and profit-making. 
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Figure 1: Allowances for 2005-2007 
 
Figure 2: Allowances for 2008-2012 
 
Figure 3: Allowances for 2013-2020 
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By auctioning more than half the allowances in the third phase, the European Commis-
sion is hoping to successfully encounter the problem of transparency that occurred in 
Phase 1 and probably in Phase 2 as well (online source
12
). 
As the system is about to change and the operators will be forced to pay for more, if not 
all, of the required allowances from the beginning of the third phase onwards, the EU 
ETS Commission has allowed for a benchmarking system to come in place for the ef-
fective auctioning of allowances. Materially, the benchmarking is a stimulating factor 
for greener processes as well as a reward mechanism. If operators have achieved an 
“ambitious benchmark” set by the EU ETS in the previous two periods, then those oper-
ators will be granted all the allowances they need (online source
13
). Naturally reaching 
the ambitious benchmark means that a company has implemented measures and proce-
dures that have turned its production line to a greener one. So benchmarking is a re-
ward. In the event that the best case scenario is not met, then the operators will need to 
either lower their emissions or purchase more allowances in both of which cases this is 
an additional expense (online source -13-).   
Finally, one perhaps wonders what is the outcome of implementing the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. How has the EU Emissions Trading System benefited the European 
countries and companies to better manage their carbon emissions? Despite the fact that 
the market price for carbon has been a thorn for economists and investment plans have 
dwindled to failure especially in the original phase of the ETS, overall, companies have 
more or less managed to meet the cap set by the EU according to the Kyoto Protocol.  
That in itself is a great achievement, as this is the first time that a system has been so 
successfully implemented and reached its long-term targets concerning environmental 
issues. Accordingly, it cannot be overlooked that the ETS wholly replaced the existing 
penalties system for carbon emissions that amounted to neck-breaking fines for compa-
nies and equally expensive products for the retail market with a friendlier system that 
aims to actually motivate rather than aggravate its operators. There are penalties within 
the ETS as well, as it cannot be an all-forgiving system when it comes to environmental 
matters. “If a company fails to surrender sufficient allowances EUAs to its Government 
at the end of each yearly reconciliation period, it faces a fine of €40/tonne in Phase 1 
                                                 
12
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/auctioning/index_en.htm 
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/benchmarking/index_en.htm 
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and €100/tonne in Phase 2, in addition to having to purchase the equivalent shortfall for 
retirement the following year” (Ramakrishnan, 2008). 
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3 Methodology and Data Anal-
ysis 
3.1 Methodology analysis  
Until 2008 the Public Power Corporation controlled about 90% of the energy market in 
Greece and was the only distributor of electricity both in the industries and the house-
holds. From a formal report that was compiled in 2008 by the PPC it was made clear 
that the financial landscape of the national power corporation was not favourable and 
this is still so. The price of the KWh in Greece neither reflects nor covers the real cost 
for the production and distribution of energy. In the 2008 PPC report a comparison was 
made between the system that Greece has in place for the production and distribution of 
power to the system that is used in almost all other European countries. In Greece, cus-
tomers receive an invoice that does not detail the different cost components. The respec-
tive invoice of another European country has distinct fields where the charges are la-
beled for the several different stages the power goes through from the original stage of 
production till the ending stage of consumption. Specifically, the problem lies in the fact 
that the PPC is responsible for all intermediate stages of power transfer and distribution, 
besides production whereas in Europe there are three different agents that take on the 
three different processes of production, transfer and distribution. Borrowing a schematic 
depiction from the 2008 PPC report in Picture 3 the differences of Greek system and the 
European practice are obvious. 
 
             Picture 3: Differences found in the energy markets of Greece and other European countries 
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The Greek invoice only relates the amount of power that has been consumed by a spe-
cific unit – house or workplace or industry – and the overall amount of money that the 
consumer has been charged with, with little or no information as to the costs of the three 
distinct phases from production to consumption. If any costs are mentioned, then these 
are the costs of production. But it is questionable whether even that is a real price. Un-
fortunately the national power company seems to be playing in a one-player game. That 
means that the PPC is able to completely form the market. In the past few years, the 
Greek state has allowed power companies to “rent” power lines from the PPC in a rela-
tively low price, which the companies then make available to consumers seemingly in 
lower prices than the PPC would charge. However, legislation has enacted no bill to 
protect the rights of these newly-founded companies or to regulate the trading rights and 
responsibilities of the parties involved and many of these power companies have al-
ready gone bankrupt leaving citizens in a dead-end situation of going back to the PPC. 
Despite being a monopolist, the PPC reports a deficit as high as €750 million annually 
compared to its European counterparts. Even the administration of the national power 
company finds it hard to pinpoint the reasons that create this deficit. The Greek con-
sumers are enjoying the lowest prices per KWh in the EU 15 and one of the lowest in 
the EU 27, however this price may seem unreasonably high and it is steadily increasing 
as GDP increases.  
Given these problems in specifying the market price for electricity in Greece, we are 
faced with a methodological challenge. How can we implement the extra cost of CO2 
emissions allowances to the price of power without even a base equation upon which to 
estimate the price of power? We are interested in two periods. One is before the Kyoto 
Protocol compliance for CO2 emissions and the other is after. To calculate the price we 
have chosen to use a theoretical equation according to which we can assume that the 
price of a KWh is calculated, not in accordance to the charges of the Greek invoice but 
in accordance to the more politically correct European system. This equation takes the 
following form: 
Total Price € = (a*KWh + b*KWh + c*KWh) * tax,      (1)            
Where a*KWh = Cost of production, a = the number of KWhs consumed 
 b*KWh = Cost of transfer, b = the units of KWhs charged  
 c*KWh = Cost of distribution, c = the KWhs charged 
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which we consider to have been used until 2011. In the equation parameters a, b and c 
are constants that reflect the prices charged per KWh due to production, transfer and 
distribution services. This equation could potentially be used for the estimation of prices 
for power, if the PPC chooses to delegate these responsibilities to other companies. As 
it is, the price of one MWh for the average household consumer in the first half of 2008 
was €104,7 (roughly 10,5 cents/KWh). 
Recently the form of the PPC invoice has changed in ways that allow the consumer to 
see the costs of transfer and distribution that are included in the final charge. In detail, 
the charges in the new PPC invoice that the consumer receives are: the cost for the na-
tional transfer system, the cost for the national distribution network, the contribution for 
welfare services per invoice, the cost of purchasing CO2 allowances and a category la-
beled “Other Charges”. From the new-type invoice it becomes clear that the cost of 
transportation and the cost of distribution are taken as fixed costs that do not fluctuate 
according to the amount of energy consumed. Thus, in equation (1) the terms b*KWh 
and c*KWh are transformed into new fixed values k and l as shown in equation (2). 
New terms must also be inserted to include all the charges mentioned. 
 
Total Price € = a*x + k + l + m + a*w + n,      (2)            
Where a*x = Cost of production, a = number of KWhs consumed, x = cost/KWh 
 k = Cost of transfer (standard price) 
 l = Cost of distribution (standard price) 
 m =  Charge for welfare service (standard price) 
 a*w = Cost of CO2 allowances, a = number of KWhs, w = cost/KWh 
 n = Other charges (unspecified) 
Although in Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS Greece purchased no extra allowances, there 
was a minimal charge per KWh for CO2 allowances that was roughly 0,5 cents (0,005 €) 
for domestic consumers. In Phases 1 and 2 only 5% and 10% of the allowances was 
auctioned and so the prices for carbon remained relatively manageable. In Phase 3, 
however, 60% of the allowances will be auctioned so it is safe to presume that the cost 
of allowances for the Greek consumer will increase. We choose to assume that the con-
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sumer will have to pay 60 times the price that he paid for allowances until 2012 and 
then the cost rises from 0,5 cents to 3 cents/KWh for CO2 allowances. For each consum-
ing unit the cost of CO2 emissions will be defined by individual consumption. The offi-
cial agent in the power market expects the cost of CO2 emissions to be 2,6 cents/KWh 
(PPC report, 2008), which proves our assumption roughly right. To calculate an overall 
price per KWh, according to the above equations, if the price was roughly 10,5 cents in 
2008, with the added cost of the carbon allowances it is expected to come up to almost 
13 cents/KWh.  
3.2 Forming the prices  
As already mentioned in the introduction the price of the carbon in the emissions trad-
ing market is influenced by a number of important and interrelated factors. The factors 
analysed in the first part of this paper are very important but somewhat abstract, for ex-
ample the weather, and not fully predictable the weather. However, ever since the EU 
has entered the race for greener energy production all the influencing factors that can be 
controlled and predicted have become the focus of economic analysis. The main goal of 
the analysis is to build models that explain the workings of the market so that fluctua-
tions of prices such as the ones experienced in the first period can be anticipated. Then 
policies can be designed to smooth so that the investment in trading out fluctuations 
carbon allowances is not jeopardized neither for the seller nor for the buyer. 
Economic analysis attempts to answer questions such as: How does the market work? 
How do governments allocate permits? In which case does a company need to buy al-
lowances? When should a firm sell its surplus? In a few words, the answers to these 
questions define both how the market works as well as how the carbon prices are deter-
mined. What happens in the formation of the CO2 market more or less is that by March 
of each year in the first two periods of the EU ETS each country distributes allowances 
that are going to be needed for the country’s industry to cover the cap of the CO2 emis-
sions. Each company compiles a report that estimates the number of allowances re-
quired to cover the CO2 emissions for the following year. The estimation is based on 
recorded emissions of previous years. Then, the national governing body gives to the 
EU ETS a total number of tons of CO2 that are going to be emitted from its industry. 
The cap that is set by the EU is not the same for all countries, but it depends on a num-
ber of factors such as population – to estimate the need in power consumption, for ex-
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ample – and the heavy industry portion that exists in each country. Namely, a country 
like Germany that has extensive heavy industry, such as car manufacturing, will be 
granted bigger number of allowances by the EU in comparison to Lithuania which is a 
significantly smaller country with smaller population and no heavy industry. The na-
tional governing body then allows a certain volume of emissions – again regulated by 
the EU – for each operator. The first part of trading takes place within the country as 
operators that have managed to lower their emissions and do not use all their allowanc-
es, are in the privileged position to sell the remaining allowances to operators that have 
exceeded their allowed CO2 volume. A country is considered to have a surplus of al-
lowances to sell when all its needs for allowances are covered on a national level and 
more allowances can be made available to trade in the international market. Naturally, 
operators that have switched to using renewable energy sources tend to have more al-
lowances to trade relative to operators that continue on their business-as-usual energy 
consumption plan.  
However, the flexibility of the cap-and-trade system in the EU allows companies to buy 
and sell allowances internationally and not only at the national level. For example, if a 
power company in Greece needs to buy allowances to cover its CO2 emissions then it is 
not necessary to buy them from other Greek companies. Allowances can be bought an-
ywhere in the thirty participating countries of the ETS. The European Commission asks 
that each country holds an auction so that allowances that are available can be traded. In 
the auctions representatives of all interested bodies – regardless of the country – are 
welcomed. The Gross Domestic Product of each country naturally plays an essential 
role in forming the purchasing power of each country for carbon in the auctions. A 
country that has lower monthly wages and lower cost of life – namely a developing 
country – will most likely sell its allowances to a more favourable price for the buyer 
than a developed country, because the profit of the seller will be considerably high, 
whereas the cost for the buyer will be considerably low. If the same number of allow-
ances is bought from a country with higher GDP then the tendency is for prices to be 
higher. This creates an imbalance in the carbon market. The companies that come from 
countries with lower GDPs have the opportunity to maximize their profit by selling their 
available allowances to companies from richer more stable markets. That means that the 
companies from the poorer, less stable markets have limited options for buying allow-
ances and they usually have to buy them at a dear price.  
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In this paper we propose that from the third phase onwards, the EU ETS should aim to 
establish a unified starting price for all auctions that will take place in the countries-
members so that all sellers have an equal starting chance and all buyers alike have an 
equal buying power. Should the price start from a relatively low level then all partici-
pants can have an equal opportunity to buy allowances at relatively manageable prices, 
regardless their country’s GDP. Therefore companies with low purchasing power will 
be able to buy allowances within their means. At the same time this does not signify that 
selling companies will lose profit or make an unfavourable investment, as the profit 
from selling the allowances is an extra capital for the company. One reason why the 
system of buying and selling allowances in the first period that ETS came in action was 
because according to the Graph 3 compiled by Trotignon and Delbosc (2008) there were 
more allowances available than actually needed and therefore the trading price bore no 
significance as supply exceeded demand.  
 
Graph 3: Surpluses and Deficits for EU ETS in the first trading period 2005-2007 
Besides the GDP that as shown and mentioned in a number of literature sources is a 
driving factor for getting carbon prices, other factors are also important. Reinaud (2007) 
offers the following list of parameters influencing the price of carbon abatement op-
tions, hedging strategies and opening registries. Specifically, when talking about abate-
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ment cost of CO2 we refer to the reduction of CO2 emissions by using more green ener-
gy sources rather than continuing the consumption of fossil fuels. Besides reducing the 
emissions, the EU rewards operators that have proceeded to such steps by allocating 
them the same amount of allowances in order to provide more tradable goods to these 
operators and hence more profit. Naturally, there is a point in the future that ideally all 
operators will have switched to green or renewable energy sources so in theory the 
emissions trading market will dwindle and eventually die out, but that would be neces-
sarily a positive turn for green industry. Considering immediate results, abatement is 
also a positive turn both for operators and consumers as lower production prices for 
power plants means that the consumers will also purchase power at a cheaper price. As 
for the hedging strategies, these refer to the cost of power when generating companies 
sell their product to distributing companies. Within the selling price, allowances for 
CO2 emissions are included for the foreseeable future, thus determining the future prices 
for electricity. Notably, in Greece that this case study is focused on, the generation and 
distribution of power are still handled by one agent only, so it will be interesting to see 
how that influencing factors work in the favour – or not – of the Greek consumer. Final-
ly, the opening of registries has already been analysed and concerns the allowances 
available and the allowances needed so that compliance is achieved for all operators 
with the EU ETS.    
3.3 Data Analysis 
Before analyzing the data that concern Greece, it is wise to take a look to the data of 
emissions and allowances purchases that have taken place across Europe during the first 
two phases. Because the data are extensive we choose three countries as representatives 
of more or less the overall European market for allowances. The three countries are 
Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom. The selection was not random. We have 
extensively taken in consideration the emissions recorded in these countries as well as 
the requirements for purchasing allowances and the ability to sell allowances. All data 
used in this section were collected from an online source about the carbon market data 
(online source
14
). 
                                                 
14
 http://www.carbonmarketdata.com/en/home 
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              Chart 1: Average verified emissions- allocated allowances for Phases 1 & 2 
As is seen in Chart 1, Denmark has not exceeded its allocations in the first phase the 
number of allocations for 2005-2007 were 31,038,061 on average whereas the volume 
of verified emissions was 30027569 on average. These numbers differ slightly but they 
represent thousands of allowances that equal thousands of tons of emissions. In Phase 2 
however, the Danish industry almost managed to bring the allowances to equilibrium. 
The chart shows that there was an excess of emissions so Denmark had to buy allow-
ances. According to the European Environmental Agency report for Phase 2, published 
in April 2011, Denmark as well as most countries participating in the ETS, have made 
progress in Phase 2 (Chart 2). A closer look at the progress of Denmark reveals that the 
country managed to reduce CO2 emissions in a period of almost twenty years since 
1990 by 7% (EEA, 2011). Denmark is responsible for about 1,3% of CO2 emissions in 
the EU. In Phase 2 of the ETS there was originally a decline in the emissions of the 
Danish in 2008 and 2009, but the next year there was a slight increase. EEA (2011) in-
cludes as part of the reason why there was a decrease originally the decrease of produc-
tion in the cement industry in 2008-2009. As for reaching the Kyoto target for emission 
reductions, Denmark, much like many countries in the EU, is considerably below the 
emissions of 2005, but not within the emissions imposed by the Protocol.  
Finland presents a similar picture to Denmark, only more favourable. The emissions al-
located to Finland in Phases 1 and 2, were covered by the provided allowances. Accord-
ing to EEA (2011) Finland still bases a large volume of electricity production and other 
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industries on fossil fuels, mostly due to the low price that the fuel is traded for in the 
market. Finland is responsible for about 1.3% of CO2 emissions in the EU. The country 
saw an increase in emissions from 1990, which finally dropped in 2009. Since Finland 
relies extensively on agriculture, it was the changing of laws concerning agricultural 
practices to greener methods and waste management schemes that improved the situa-
tion. However in 2010 there was an increase in emissions, largely due to heavy winter 
and thus the increased need for heating. As gas has not substituted coal in energy-
consuming activities the increase in emissions was inevitable. Finland, however, has 
achieved the Kyoto target for the first compliance period (EEA, 2011). In Chart 2 it is 
obvious that Finland, despite seemingly minimal effort has managed to stay within the 
cap in both the phases of ETS. 
 
                                Chart 2: Average emissions-to-cap % for Phases 1 & 2 
The UK mostly because of its heavy industry was required to buy allowances in the CO2 
market to cover the excess of carbon emissions relative to the cap set by the EU in 
Phase 1 as well as in Phase 2. It is important for the United Kingdom to cover the EU 
cap, because UK is responsible for about 13% of the EU CO2 emissions. Despite the 
fact that UK was required to purchase allowances to cover its emissions in both phases 
of the ETS, its emissions have seen constant decrease since 1990. All industrial sectors 
managed to decrease emissions, except transportation which increased emissions steadi-
ly till 2007 and then declined in the following two years (EEA, 2011). The fuel for elec-
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tricity and heating was also converted from coal to gas over the twenty years since 1990 
and that also helped decrease emissions (EEA, 2011). As is obvious in Chart 2 the UK 
has had the most impressive decrease of average emissions-to-cap percentage from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2. 
3.4 The case of Greece 
Greece like all other European countries was both compelled and ready to take part in 
the race to battle climate change. For that purpose the Hellenic State participated in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that took place 
in Rio De Janeiro in June 1992 and signed the agreement for GHG emissions reduction, 
which was then ratified in 1994 (Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, 
2012). “The Protocol calls for legally binding commitments of the developed countries 
to reduce, individually or jointly, emissions of 6 greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFC, PFC and SF6) by more than 5% in the period 2008 to 2012, below their 1990 lev-
el” (Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, 2012). It is also known as 
the Kyoto Protocol, because the formation of the agreement took place in the third 
meeting to the UNFCCC which was in Kyoto in 1997.  
As all participating countries, Greece was under the obligation to compile a National 
Allocation Plan that would be applied in the trial period before the Kyoto commitment 
period of 2008-2012 as regulated by the official governing body for emissions reduction 
that the EU formed to achieve the Kyoto targets, which was the ETS. In March 2004 
EU-15 were given a period of two months to complete and submit their NAPs as Janu-
ary 2005 was established as the time for the ETS to go into action. Greece and the rest 
12 members-states of the EU had a supplementary thirty days to compile and complete 
their NAPs. However, our country failed to keep the deadline. The NAP that finally 
submitted to the European Commission and accepted, allowed Greece to participate in 
Phase 1 of the ETS in June of 2005 half a year after the trial period had commenced.  
Finally, in Greece the governing body that regulates and controls that participation of 
Greece in the EU ETS is the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change.  
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The Ministry is 
“responsible for the development and implementation of environmental pol-
icy in Greece, as well as for the provision of information concerning the 
state of the environment in compliance with relevant requirements defined 
in international conventions, protocols and agreements. Moreover, the 
MEECC is responsible for the co-ordination of all involved ministries, as 
well as any relevant public or private organization, in relation to the imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, according to the Law 
3017/2002 with which Greece ratified the Kyoto Protocol.” (Ministry of En-
vironment, Energy and Climate Change, 2012). 
Despite the delay of Greece to submit its NAP and engage to its commitments for emis-
sions reduction, there is considerable effort to meet its target. Charts 3 and 4 illustrates 
the progress the Greece has made in Phase 1 is per industrial sector. 
 
             Chart 3: Average allocated allowances & verified emissions for 2005-2007 
As is obvious in Chart 3 the majority of verified emissions in Greece, like in the UK, is 
generated from the combustion industry, hence the lion’s portion of allocations needs to 
be given to that sector. As allowances in Phase 1 were provided by a percentage of 95% 
free of cost to countries, Greece was awarded enough allowances from the EU so it was 
not necessary for extra allowances to be bought. However, from Charts 3 and 5 the sec-
tor of combustion has been found to be in need of allowances. It seems that as a country 
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Greece has not needed to buy allowances other than the ones allocated, but as an indus-
trial sector the combustion sector has need to go forward and buy some allowances to 
meet the cap set by the EU.  
 
Table 2: Average allocated allowances & verified emissions for 2005-2007 per activity 
Table 2 
Activity 
 
Average allocated allowances 
for 2005 – 2007 
Average verified emissions 
2005-2007 
Bricks & Ceramics 785346 744475,3 
Cement & Lime 11731256 11373247 
Combustion 53362312 53595595 
Glass 105441 55411 
Iron & Steel 664210 397597,7 
Paper 203428 184641 
Refining 3432002 4102871 
Roasting & Sintering 878437 862800,7 
 
From Table 2, it is obvious that the allowances that were given to the Greek state and 
then allocated to the industrial sectors exceeded the verified emissions’ volumes that the 
respective industries had recorded in Phase 1. So it is safe to say that Greece was within 
its obligations for Phase 1 of the EU ETS despite the delayed start. However two sec-
tors, combustion and refining were net buyers of allowances. Chart 4 shows that most 
industrial sectors that are responsible for emissions in Greece, have a negative percent-
age of average emissions-to-cap. Negative percentages indicate that the emissions are 
lower than the cap, and hence within the target. The Refining industry is the one sector 
wherein emissions decrease should take place or else allowances to be bought. To a 
lesser extent refining also needs to buy allowances. 
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                                   Chart 4: Average emissions-to-cap % 2005-2007 
Charts 5 and 6 are the respective depictions of Greece’s performance in the reduction of 
emissions for the first Kyoto commitment period that started in January 2008 and ends 
the coming December. In Table 3 the numbers of average verified emissions and allo-
cated allowances again clearly state that the emissions of Greece for the second phase of 
the ETS Greece were within the EU cap. EEA (2012) reports that emissions for Greece 
were on the rise since 1990 but came to a stabilized halt in 2005, Greece entered the 
ETS. An explanation that is provided for the increasing emissions volumes has to do 
with the increase of the GDP during the fifteen years following 1990. The number of 
cars on the streets has increased about four times relative to the number in the early ‘90s 
and the industrial sector and construction industry both saw great development as well, 
which were significant reasons for intense production and consequently higher emis-
sions’ rate.   
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Table 3: Average allocated allowances & verified emissions for 2008-2012 per activity 
Table 3 
Activity 
 
Average allocated allowances 
for 2008 – 2012 
Average verified emissions 
2008-2011 
Bricks & Ceramics 975064,4 344428,8 
Cement & Lime 11686246 7419491 
Combustion 45330408 50210492 
Glass 57117 44530,25 
Iron & Steel 545696,8 291634,3 
Paper 193481 161593 
Refining 4055682 3951928 
Roasting & Sintering 809669 649176 
 
 
 
              Chart 5: Average allocated allowances & verified emissions for 2008-2012 
 
Chart 6 shows the emissions-to-cap percentile for Phase 2. Negative prices show that 
the emissions were within the cap.  
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                                 Chart 6: Average emissions-to-cap % 2008-2012 
Comparing the performance of Greece in the first and second phase for overall GHG 
emissions as compiled according to data taken from the online source of carbon market 
data (online source -14-), it is obvious in Chart 7 that in Phase 2 Greece has managed to 
lower emissions altogether in all the emitting sectors that have been included under the 
European cap. The EEA supporting this in the official report that was compiled till 
2010, reports that Greece was on track to meeting the Kyoto target. That, however, is 
not the case for the coming third period.  
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                               Chart 7: Average GHG emissions for Greece by sector 
3.5 Energy sector in Greece 
One of the major contributors of GHG emissions in Greece as well as a major economic 
factor is the energy sector – as is in other countries as well. Because of the composition 
of GDP, the structure of the country’s production and the favourable climatic conditions 
“energy demand is […] rising rapidly” (European Profiles, 2004). Currently the energy 
production in Greece is based on oil, coal, natural gas and renewable sources such as 
solar, wind, biomass, hydropower and geothermal energy (online source
15
). The most 
recent addition to greener energy sources is the installation of photovoltaic systems that 
has been extensively advertised in the last few years not only as a green energy source 
but also as a sound market investment. Greece, however, has a long-standing history of 
looking for alternative energy sources to substitute coal and fossil fuels, mainly due to 
its geographical position. Since the mid-‘90s wind-turbines and solar energy panels 
have been implemented partially for generating power for domestic use, especially in 
remote places where the power-lines are often in peril or not working because of the 
extreme weather conditions. Such locations are usually islands in the Greek Seas. Also 
there are eighteen hydro-electric plants that produce power to cover the needs of the 
                                                 
15
 http://www.ypeka.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=225&locale=el-GR&language=en-US  
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population and the industry. Four of those facilities are categorized as major production 
units because they produce more than 10MW voltage (Fetani et al., presentation). Be-
sides those four major units there are 14 smaller units that produce less than 10MW 
voltage taking advantage of the fall of water and turning the hydro energy into electric. 
Traditional polluting energy fuels besides oil have been lignite and coal. The most 
widely used fuel remains the oil as it covers about 55% of the market needs on energy 
(online source
16
). Below is a schematic picture of the use of the several sources of ener-
gy in Greece in 1991. 
 
                              Graph 4: Energy production sectors in Greece 1991 
From the pie in Graph 4, diesel fuel, petrol and crude oil, are all derivatives of oil fuels 
so adding them all up makes up about 68% which was the production of energy from 
fossil fuels twenty years ago (Fetani et al., 2010). In 2010 the amount of energy produc-
tion from oil was roughly 55%. The current picture of energy sources in Greece for 
2012 is shown in Graph 5 and the prediction of the several sources that will make up the 
total of the energy market in Greece is as shown in Graph 6 (online source 16). As it is 
predicted in Graph 6, solar energy can potentially cover about 7% of the population 
needs in energy, the percentage of wind power is double that and the rest of the renewa-
ble energy can amount up to 23% or more. According to the same online source, Greece 
                                                 
16
 http://www.balkanalysis.com/greece/2011/03/20/the-greek-energy-sector-in-2011-corporate-
profiles-of-the-major-players/  
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could potentially become an autonomous energy producer for all its population and in-
dustry by the mid-21
st
 century (online source 16). 
 
 
                             Graph 5: Contribution of Energy Sources in Greece 2012 
 
                        Graph 6: Predictions for the Energy sector in Greece by 2020 
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3.6 The Public Power Corporation – DEI 
The producing and distributing organization of power in Greece is a state enterprise 
called the Public Power Corporation – DEI in Greek abbreviation. According to an offi-
cial report from the OECD about the market share of the PPC in the energy market, the 
state corporation holds about 75% of the total production of energy in the country and is 
responsible for 90% of the distribution of energy (OECD, 2001). In the official page of 
the PCC, the plants that are included as property of the Public Power Corporation are 23 
wind parks, 15 hydroelectric facilities, and 11 photovoltaic stations, as well as 3 geo-
thermal parks, 18 thermal parks and in total 92 power stations and production units 
throughout Greece (online source
17
). The PPC caters the needs of 7,5 million people in 
Greece.  
However, this creates in imbalance in the power market. The majority of the market be-
longs to the PPC, which means that this entity is almost solely responsible for the for-
mation of the prices of energy in the Greek market. In a report compiled in 2008 by 
PPC, it is stated clearly that the cost of production of energy from the public corporation 
is not reflected in the invoices of sales of power. The same conclusion is included in the 
OECD report. In the PPC report of 2008, the authors make clear that the financial effi-
ciency of the PPC is not what it should be considering two factors: 1) that this is almost 
the unique energy provider in the entire of Greece and 2) that in other European coun-
tries with similar characteristics, the economic results of the energy companies – which 
are mostly not state-owned – are much better. At the same time that the Greek public 
has been suffering from a continuous mounting of electricity prices – not only due to the 
economic recession of the last three four years but even before that – the official PPC 
representative gives no account for.       
3.6.1 Concluding Remarks 
At present, Greece tries to follow closely European trends and amend its polluting ener-
gy sources by substituting them with greener energy production. Besides switching 
from petrol to natural gas for the heating demands of areas with high density of popula-
tion, photovoltaic units are becoming a large investment in the energy market and “an 
increase and diversification in renewable energy resources” are in order in the near fu-
                                                 
17
 http://www.dei.com.gr/Default.aspx 
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ture (online source
18
). These steps to greener energy should lead to “the reduction of oil 
imports” and regulate the CO2 emissions of our country in the long run (online source 
18).  
This process will significantly alter the country’s present energy status 
and will require substantial amounts of investments, along with importa-
tion of know-how and a whole array of supplementary services for the 
next generation. But the cost and effort will be worth it, if it can cumu-
latively guarantee a larger degree of energy independence and sustaina-
bility for Greece (online source 18). 
The effort to follow the European example more closely is also depicted in the refor-
mation of the PPC invoices which have recently changed. The hope and recommenda-
tion of our European partners is that the energy market in Greece should undergo a radi-
cal makeover where a new power sector will emerge and the managing of energy is de-
centralized from the one agent who is currently handling all aspects from production to 
distribution several participating agents that will have their respective share of produc-
tion, transfer and distribution of energy to the end-consumer (OECD, 2011). 
 
                                                 
18
 http://www.balkanalysis.com/greece/2011/04/26/greeces-energy-plans-projects-and-key-
actors-2011-and-beyond/  
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4 Results, Conclusions and 
Policy Recommendations 
Borrowing the data compiled in the EEA report of 2011, there are four sectors that stand 
out as the major contributors to CO2 and GHG emissions for Europe. Their importance 
is very high for both the EU-15 and the EU-27 countries. These are the energy supply 
industry which is responsible for the lion’s portion of emissions, the energy use sector, 
the transportation industry and agriculture. We have chosen to examine the energy sup-
ply and energy use sectors as one, under the title-umbrella of energy market. From Ta-
ble 4, collectively the energy market emits around 58- 59% of the GHGs in Europe 
(based on data from the EEA report, 2008). However, the country leaders of the mem-
bers-states have long engaged in the process of changing state policies in the energy 
sector in order to comply with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol and prove the 
ETS as a successful collective effort to meet the emissions cap set and reduce polluting 
gases in the atmosphere. 
Table 4: Source of GHGs for the EU15 & EU27 
Table 4 
Source of GHGs  EU 15 EU 27 
Energy Supply 29.8% 32.4% 
Energy Use 28.3% 26.7% 
Transport  21.8% 20.2% 
Agriculture 10.2% 10.3% 
Other Sources 9.9% 10.4% 
 
At the same time taking into consideration that upon entering Phase 3 of the EU ETS 
the carbon and GHG allowances are going to be auctioned for the largest part, it is a 
good idea that the power sector is moving towards natural gas and renewable sources. 
Energy will be the market mostly affected, financially, by the need to buy allowances to 
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meet the cap. Efforts have already been made by the major energy producers of Europe 
to move away from the “older, dirtier oil, coal and lignite plants” to environmentally-
friendlier sources, implementing greener technologies and practices in the production 
and trading of power (Turner et al., 2009). According to Turner et al. (2009), power 
companies are taking into consideration the mandatory target for emissions imposed by 
the EU and switch from coal to gas or renewables. The climbing price for carbon is also 
a factor affecting this decision. However, when projecting future prices for the power 
unit, the survey group report that management considers coal prices as a factor that is 
not going to be eliminated in the future, even after the end of Phase 3 of the ETS in 
2020 (Turner et al., 2009). One reason is that it is imperative that a target emissions-cap 
exists in order for incentives towards cleaner technologies of energy to continue being 
sought for and invested in (Turner et al., 2009). 
The third factor that influenced CO2 emissions overall in all 30 countries participating 
in the EU ETS in 2008 was the economic recession (EEA, 2011). Sadly, it took eco-
nomic problems and a threat for financial collapse to force European citizens to reform 
their environment-expensive lifestyles to greener ones. As we felt more secure in 2009 
and even more so in 2010, the impact of our security was obvious in the climbing num-
bers of CO2 emissions. Based on data that show transportation as one major contributor 
of CO2 emissions, all the stories of eco-groups are verified. Once petrol prices go up 
people stop using their cars as frequently and once petrol prices go down the opposite 
effect also takes place. A logical conclusion is that the economic growth within coun-
tries leads to more extensive consumption of fossil fuels and greater GHG emissions. Is 
it a sound measure, then, to inhibit economic growth for the common benefit of the 
planet? Naturally no. Partly because the planet does offer alternatives to the precious 
traditional oil-based fuel that humanity has consumed massively in the last 200 years; 
and partly because mankind cannot be stopped from progressing on account of a prob-
lem that can be solved either in short-term or in long-term. That leads us to conclude 
that although measures have been taken for the industries to change their polluting poli-
cies to cleaner sources, the same cannot be said for providing motivation to the average 
power consumer. In the future this would not, perhaps, be necessary as the people con-
sume less products and consequently emit less CO2 in the atmosphere.  
Lastly, there is the agriculture that is the fourth polluting factor in the EU. The sector of 
agriculture could be characterized as a secret contributor, as common sense dictates that 
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the person exploiting the land would not employ means that can potentially harm either 
land or air. Massive increase in demand of produce, however, has driven for years farm-
ers to use polluting agents against their better judgment. For this reason, the Land Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry – abbreviated to LULUCF – has been a scheme for the 
better use of the land and the implementation of cleaner practices and policies. The need 
for that change has been long overdue, as the land vegetation is considered the lung of 
the planet. The “LULUCF has impacts on the global carbon cycle and as such these ac-
tivities can add or remove carbon dioxide […] from the atmosphere, contributing 
to climate change” (online source19). The importance of LULUCF policies lies in the 
fact that the land that is converted from forest areas to cultivable land means a dramatic 
reduction of the CO2 absorption from the air. The online source speaks of a 1,6±0,8 Gt 
more of CO2 remaining in the atmosphere per year due to forest area lost. EEA (2011) 
reports that this is undergoing a change not unlike the other three polluting sectors to the 
benefit of the environment.    
In conclusion what is Europe, and Greece specifically, expected to face in the carbon 
market in the future? Having thoroughly analysed how the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme has worked in the first two phases and how it is expected to work in Phase 3, it 
is obvious that from 2013 and on countries in Europe will be required to buy allowanc-
es, as the majority of the allowances will not be freely allocated but auctioned. The low 
cost of emissions that has been the carbon market reality so far will radically change. 
Practically, for Greece, what is expected to happen is that an extra cost will be added. 
Considering that the EEA report for Greece complying with the Kyoto Commitment till 
2020 is not favourable, the Greek State should expected that the number of allocated 
allowances that were bestowed to the Greek industry up till Phase 2 will not be nearly 
enough for the coming third phase. The cost of the carbon allowances, then, is expected 
to climb swiftly for two reasons. Obviously 60% of the emissions’ margin that was giv-
en to Greece for free is now going to be paid for. In addition to that, however, there will 
be extra added cost due to the extra allowances that will have to be purchased eventual-
ly if the Greek industry does not take steps to change its energy source for greener ones 
and thus meet the cap. 
 
                                                 
19
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_use,_land-use_change_and_forestry 
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4.1 Recommendations  
It has been made clear that incentives are a prerequisite if Europe is to become the lead-
ing green society it aspires to be. As economic recessions played an important role in 
the reduction of electricity and transportation usage in 2008, economic incentives could 
be given to all types of consumers to drive them to greener sources of energy or wiser 
use of the energy provided. An obvious solution towards fewer carbon and GHG emis-
sions would be for consumers to switch their power supplier source from petrol/lignite-
based to natural gas-based or better yet a renewable source. However, such alteration 
usually requires certain reformation to the supplying network that burden equally the 
consumer and the state. Once the consumer realizes that alterations are costly, they tend 
to postpone the switch. If the state provides economic incentives short-term or middle-
term, it would make the average household much more decisive in turning to greener 
energy sources. Although this sounds like a plan that would eventually cost dearly ei-
ther to the state or the consumer the overall result would be a significant reduction of 
CO2 and other GHGs emissions. The ingenuity of the mechanism would obviously be 
for a governmental body to equalize the cost of switching to greener energy sources in 
the energy market with the profit from the carbon allowances market, so that neither the 
state nor the consumer is dissatisfied with the change. Other such recommendations are 
made by several literature sources. Quoting one of them for Greece especially, the 
change of the electricity bill from a holistic calculation of the electricity parameters as 
they are at present to a parametric one that each service included will be billed separate-
ly is considered a mandatory change for more accurate billing and more accurate esti-
mation of costs and profits (Mckinsey and Company, 2012). Another that is also clearly 
suggested by the EEA is the expansion of the energy market so that other companies are 
included and there is sufficient competitiveness for more efficient price forming (2011; 
Mckinsey and Company, 2012). Finally basing the energy market on natural gas is a 
third recommendation that is expected to revolutionise and make the Greek energy mar-
ket independent (Mckinsey and Company, 2012).  
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Picture 4: McKinsey & Company’s table of recommendations for the reformation of Greek Energy sec-
tor
20 
 
                                                 
20
 Source: McKinsey & Company (2012) Greece 10Years Ahead: Defining Greece’s new growth model 
and strategy, Executive Summary, ed: McKinsey & Company, Athens, Greece 
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5 Predictions and Future Re-
search 
Concluding, in the course of compiling evidence for this paper, it has become clear to 
the writer and hopefully to the readers as well, that Europe has already taken several 
important steps towards a cleaner atmosphere. What is even more encouraging is that 
these policies have worked positively, both as air-cleaning mechanisms as well as in-
vestment ideas. Not only have they not jeopardized the future of the European compa-
nies, but in fact have opened new horizons both for investment and for a less endan-
gered planet. It is the prediction of the writer that following suchlike steps that have 
hitherto been taken for cleaner industrial technologies, the future of Europe will set the 
example for other large-scale emissions trading schemes, maybe even a global one. I 
believe that the paradigm of Europe, as presented here, is a bright beacon for the most 
disbelieving challenger of whether traditional industrial moguls can be turned to envi-
ronmentally-friendly massive producers. Apparently this is a goal that mankind can 
achieve. 
Practically to comply with the Kyoto Protocol commitment for the coming period of 
2013 to 2020, the policy-makers of the industry are asked to outsmart themselves and 
become even more aggressive in their policies for cleaner energy sources, transporta-
tion, agriculture and waste disposal. It is a trick that has worked so far, so I expect that 
we can only be optimistic for what the future has in store. Naturally, this further is ex-
pected to be gradual, much like the change that has been so far gradual, but in an accel-
erated mode. Having said that, it took about 200 years for man to learn to take ad-
vantage of other energy sources the planet has to offer but it is a battle that goes strong. 
Bringing the paper to a close, I cannot help but wonder how Phase 3 of the ETS will 
progress in comparison to the predictions that have already been made and the prices 
and costs that have been calculated in the literature. It is my hope that the literature, 
young as it is, will grow multi-paged soon, and that further studies from the various 
agents will continue to feed both the industry and the governing bodies of this effort 
with criticism, when necessary, and incentive to continue to a common greener future.    
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Kyoto Protocol 
 
KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
  
The Parties to this Protocol, 
Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the Convention", 
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2, 
Recalling the provisions of the Convention, 
Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention, 
Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its first session, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall 
apply. In addition: 
1. "Conference of the Parties" means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. 
2. "Convention" means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 
in New York on 9 May 1992. 
3. "Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change" means the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and 
the United Nations Environment Programme. 
4. "Montreal Protocol" means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Lay-
er, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subsequently adjusted and amended. 
5. "Parties present and voting" means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative 
vote. 
6. "Party" means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol. 
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7. "Party included in Annex I" means a Party included in Annex I to the Convention, as may be 
amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Article 4, paragraph 2(g), of the Con-
vention. 
Article 2 
1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall: 
(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national 
circumstances, such as: 
(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy; 
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under relevant international envi-
ronmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation 
and reforestation; 
(iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change considerations; 
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and renewable forms 
of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative envi-
ronmentally sound technologies; 
(v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty 
exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective 
of the Convention and application of market instruments; 
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and 
measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol; 
(vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol in the transport sector; 
(viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in waste man-
agement, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy; 
(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness of 
their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2(e)(i), 
of the Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and ex-
change information on such policies and measures, including developing ways of improving 
their comparability, transparency and effectiveness. The Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereaf-
ter, consider ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant information. 
2. The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of green-
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization, respectively. 
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3. The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under this 
Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate 
change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other 
Parties, especially developing country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, par-
agraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Con-
ference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further ac-
tion, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, if 
it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and measures in paragraph 
1(a) above, taking into account different national circumstances and potential effects, shall con-
sider ways and means to elaborate the coordination of such policies and measures. 
Article 3 
1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggre-
gate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex 
A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limita-
tion and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achiev-
ing its commitments under this Protocol. 
3. The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting 
from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, re-
forestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in 
each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Par-
ty included in Annex I. The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associ-
ated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed 
in accordance with Articles 7 and 8. 
4. Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by the Subsidi-
ary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 
1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as 
to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and 
forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties in-
cluded in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the 
methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided 
by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 
and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and 
subsequent commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these addi-
tional human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided that these activities 
have taken place since 1990. 
5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy 
whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of the Conference of the 
Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period for the implementation of their 
commitments under this Article. Any other Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of 
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transition to a market economy which has not yet submitted its first national communication 
under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an historical base year or period oth-
er than 1990 for the implementation of its commitments under this Article. The Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the acceptance 
of such notification. 
6. Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the implementation of their 
commitments under this Protocol other than those under this Article, a certain degree of flexibil-
ity shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy. 
7. In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 to 
2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the percentage 
inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in ac-
cordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five. Those Parties included in Annex I for 
whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 
1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic car-
bon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use 
change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount. 
8. Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluorocarbons, per-
fluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the calculation referred to in para-
graph 7 above. 
9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established in 
amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such commitments at least seven years 
before the end of the first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above. 
10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party acquires 
from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added 
to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party transfers to 
another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be subtracted 
from the assigned amount for the transferring Party. 
12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 
13. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than 
its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be added to 
the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods. 
14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments mentioned in 
paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic 
impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 
and 9, of the Convention. In line with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the 
implementation of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize 
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the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties re-
ferred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of 
funding, insurance and transfer of technology. 
Article 4 
1. Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments 
under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided that their total 
combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gas-
es listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quanti-
fied emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties to 
the agreement shall be set out in that agreement. 
2. The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the agreement on 
the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Protocol, or 
accession thereto. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Conven-
tion of the terms of the agreement. 
3. Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment period 
specified in Article 3, paragraph 7. 
4. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic 
integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the organization after adoption of 
this Protocol shall not affect existing commitments under this Protocol. Any alteration in the 
composition of the organization shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under 
Article 3 that are adopted subsequent to that alteration. 
5. In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total combined lev-
el of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be responsible for its own level of 
emissions set out in the agreement. 
6. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic 
integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each member State of that re-
gional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic 
integration organization acting in accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to 
achieve the total combined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions 
as notified in accordance with this Article. 
Article 5 
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior to the start of 
the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. 
Guidelines for such national systems, which shall incorporate the methodologies specified in 
paragraph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meet-
ing of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. 
2. Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be those accepted by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at 
its third session. Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be ap-
plied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such methodologies 
and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Par-
ties. Any revision to methodologies or adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascer-
taining compliance with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period 
adopted subsequent to that revision. 
3. The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of anthropo-
genic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A shall 
be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties at its third session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming potential of each 
such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the 
Parties. Any revision to a global warming potential shall apply only to commitments under Arti-
cle 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision. 
Article 6 
1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I 
may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from 
projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic re-
movals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that: 
(a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved; 
(b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of re-
movals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur; 
(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance with its obligations 
under Articles 5 and 7; and 
(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3. 
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may, at its 
first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guidelines for the implementa-
tion of this Article, including for verification and reporting. 
3. A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its responsibil-
ity, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article of emission 
reduction units. 
4. If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the requirements referred to 
in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 8, transfers and 
acquisitions of emission reduction units may continue to be made after the question has been 
identified, provided that any such units may not be used by a Party to meet its commitments 
under Article 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved. 
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Article 7 
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 
the necessary supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 
3, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below. 
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communication, submitted 
under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information necessary to demonstrate 
compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in accordance with par-
agraph 4 below. 
3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under paragraph 1 
above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the Convention for the first year of 
the commitment period after this Protocol has entered into force for that Party. Each such Party 
shall submit the information required under paragraph 2 above as part of the first national com-
munication due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and after 
the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The frequency of subsequent 
submission of information required under this Article shall be determined by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timeta-
ble for the submission of national communications decided upon by the Conference of the Par-
ties. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the preparation of the 
information required under this Article, taking into account guidelines for the preparation of 
national communications by Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Par-
ties. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon modalities for the accounting of assigned 
amounts. 
Article 8 
1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I shall be re-
viewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Par-
ties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. The information 
submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as 
part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned amounts. 
Additionally, the information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in 
Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the review of communications. 
2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed of experts 
selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, by intergov-
ernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance provided for this purpose by 
the Conference of the Parties. 
3. The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all 
aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The expert review teams shall prepare 
a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Proto-
col, assessing the implementation of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential 
problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. Such reports shall be cir-
culated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat shall list those ques-
-66- 
tions of implementation indicated in such reports for further consideration by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the review of imple-
mentation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account the relevant decisions of 
the Conference of the Parties. 
5. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, with 
the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as appropriate, the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider: 
(a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert reviews 
thereon conducted under this Article; and 
(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3 above, as well 
as any questions raised by Parties. 
6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above, the Confer-
ence of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take decisions on 
any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol. 
Article 9 
1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall peri-
odically review this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific information and assess-
ments on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic in-
formation. Such reviews shall be coordinated with pertinent reviews under the Convention, in 
particular those required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Con-
vention. Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action. 
2. The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews shall take place at regular intervals 
and in a timely manner. 
Article 10 
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specif-
ic national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without introduc-
ing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing com-
mitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing to advance the im-
plementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into 
account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall: 
(a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national and, where ap-
propriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, activity data 
and/or models which reflect the socio-economic conditions of each Party for the preparation and 
periodic updating of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable 
methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties, and consistent with the 
guidelines for the preparation of national communications adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties; 
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(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, region-
al programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate ade-
quate adaptation to climate change: 
(i) Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, transport and industry sectors as 
well as agriculture, forestry and waste management. Furthermore, adaptation technologies and 
methods for improving spatial planning would improve adaptation to climate change; and 
(ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this Protocol, including 
national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; and other Parties shall seek to include in 
their national communications, as appropriate, information on programmes which contain 
measures that the Party believes contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse im-
pacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, and enhancement of 
and removals by sinks, capacity building and adaptation measures; 
(c) Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and dif-
fusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the 
transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and process-
es pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the formulation 
of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies 
that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for 
the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound 
technologies; 
(d) Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the maintenance and the devel-
opment of systematic observation systems and development of data archives to reduce uncer-
tainties related to the climate system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the economic 
and social consequences of various response strategies, and promote the development and 
strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in international and inter-
governmental efforts, programmes and networks on research and systematic observation, taking 
into account Article 5 of the Convention; 
(e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using existing 
bodies, the development and implementation of education and training programmes, including 
the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular human and institutional capacities 
and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular for de-
veloping countries, and facilitate at the national level public awareness of, and public access to 
information on, climate change. Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these 
activities through the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the 
Convention; 
(f) Include in their national communications information on programmes and activities under-
taken pursuant to this Article in accordance with relevant decisions of the Conference of the 
Parties; and 
(g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this Article, to Article 4, 
paragraph 8, of the Convention. 
Article 11 
1. In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provisions of Article 4, 
paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention. 
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2. In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Convention, and 
through the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the 
Convention, the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to 
the Convention shall: 
(a) Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by de-
veloping country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Arti-
cle 4, paragraph 1(a), of the Convention that are covered in Article 10, subparagraph (a); and 
(b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by 
the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the im-
plementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that are 
covered by Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the interna-
tional entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, in accordance with that Arti-
cle. 
The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the need for adequa-
cy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing 
among developed country Parties. The guidance to the entity or entities entrusted with the oper-
ation of the financial mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of 
the Parties, including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis mu-
tandis to the provisions of this paragraph. 
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the Convention 
may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources for 
the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels. 
Article 12 
1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. 
2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in 
Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of 
the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3. 
3. Under the clean development mechanism: 
(a) Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emis-
sion reductions; and 
(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such 
project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be super-
vised by an executive board of the clean development mechanism. 
5. Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by operational enti-
ties to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol, on the basis of: 
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(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; 
(b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and 
(c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the cer-
tified project activity. 
6. The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified pro-
ject activities as necessary. 
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, 
efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of project activities. 
8. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall en-
sure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative 
expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation. 
9. Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities mentioned in 
paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve pri-
vate and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by the 
executive board of the clean development mechanism. 
10. Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the be-
ginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first 
commitment period. 
Article 13 
1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meet-
ing of the Parties to this Protocol. 
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in 
the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this 
Protocol. 
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, any 
member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention 
but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be 
elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall keep 
under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make, within its mandate, the 
decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions as-
signed to it by this Protocol and shall: 
(a) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions 
of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties, the overall effects of the 
measures taken pursuant to this Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social ef-
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fects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective 
of the Convention is being achieved; 
(b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, giving due considera-
tion to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, of the 
Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its imple-
mentation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and in this respect con-
sider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this Protocol; 
(c) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to 
address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, respon-
sibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol; 
(d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by 
them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, 
responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Pro-
tocol; 
(e) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention and the provisions of 
this Protocol, and taking fully into account the relevant decisions by the Conference of the Par-
ties, the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies for the effective 
implementation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol; 
(f) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of this Protocol; 
(g) Seek to mobilize additional financial resources in accordance with 
Article 11, paragraph 2; 
(h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of this Pro-
tocol; 
(i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provid-
ed by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bod-
ies; and 
(j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Protocol, and 
consider any assignment resulting from a decision by the Conference of the Parties. 
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures applied un-
der the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under this Protocol, except as may be oth-
erwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Par-
ties to this Protocol. 
6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the entry into force of this Protocol. Subse-
quent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Confer-
ence of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
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7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of 
any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by 
the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties. 
8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, 
may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Protocol 
and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Confer-
ence of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, may be 
so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participa-
tion of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above. 
Article 14 
1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this 
Protocol. 
2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and 
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the functioning of the sec-
retariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise 
the functions assigned to it under this Protocol. 
Article 15 
1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve as, respectively, 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Im-
plementation of this Protocol. The provisions relating to the functioning of these two bodies un-
der the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings of 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Im-
plementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Imple-
mentation of the Convention. 
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in 
the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary bodies serve as the 
subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that 
are Parties to this Protocol. 
3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their 
functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the Bureaux of those 
subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a party to this Pro-
tocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties 
to this Protocol. 
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Article 16 
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, as 
soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and modify as appropriate, the 
multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the Convention, in the light of any 
relevant decisions that may be taken by the Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consulta-
tive process that may be applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the proce-
dures and mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18. 
Article 17 
The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules 
and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trad-
ing. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of 
fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domes-
tic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
under that Article. 
Article 18  
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its 
first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to 
address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the de-
velopment of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and 
frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing 
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. 
Article 19 
The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to this Protocol. 
  
Article 20 
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. 
2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed amend-
ment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months 
before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate 
the text of any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for 
information, to the Depositary. 
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this 
Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement 
reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of 
the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicat-
ed by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those 
Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an 
instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol. 
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5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after the date on 
which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said amend-
ment. 
Article 21 
1. Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly 
provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes 
thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of this Protocol shall be restricted to 
lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, proce-
dural or administrative character. 
2. Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose amendments to 
annexes to this Protocol. 
3. Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be adopted at an 
ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated to 
the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for 
adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amendment 
to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Deposi-
tary. 
4. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed annex or amendment 
to an annex by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement 
reached, the annex or amendment to an annex shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths 
majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment 
to an annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to 
all Parties for their acceptance. 
5. An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been adopted in ac-
cordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for all Parties to this Protocol six 
months after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of 
the annex or adoption of the amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have notified 
the Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex or amend-
ment to the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter into force for Parties which 
withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the date on which with-
drawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary. 
6. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to this Pro-
tocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until such time as the 
amendment to this Protocol enters into force. 
7. Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter into force in 
accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that any amendment to Annex B 
shall be adopted only with the written consent of the Party concerned. 
Article 22 
1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below. 
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, 
shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member 
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States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if 
any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa. 
Article 23 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol. 
Article 24 
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval 
by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties to the Convention. 
It shall be open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 
16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after 
the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol with-
out any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Pro-
tocol. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to this 
Protocol, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities 
for the performance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization and 
the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol concurrently. 
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic in-
tegration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters 
governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in 
turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
Article 25 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 
55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total 
for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in 
Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
2. For the purposes of this Article, "the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties 
included in Annex I" means the amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this 
Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I in their first national communications submitted in 
accordance with Article 12 of the Convention. 
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or 
approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above 
for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day 
following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
4. For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration 
organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by States members of the or-
ganization. 
 
 
  -75- 
Article 26 
No reservations may be made to this Protocol. 
 
Article 27 
1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force for a 
Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Deposi-
tary. 
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the 
Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the 
notification of withdrawal. 
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn 
from this Protocol. 
Article 28 
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Span-
ish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions. 
DONE at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have affixed 
their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated. 
Annex A 
Greenhouse gases 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) 
Methane (CH4) 
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) 
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 
Sectors/source categories 
Energy 
Fuel combustion 
Energy industries 
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Manufacturing industries and construction 
Transport 
Other sectors 
Other 
Fugitive emissions from fuels 
Solid fuels 
Oil and natural gas 
Other 
Industrial processes 
Mineral products 
Chemical industry 
Metal production 
Other production 
Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
Other 
Solvent and other product use 
Agriculture 
Enteric fermentation 
Manure management 
Rice cultivation 
Agricultural soils 
Prescribed burning of savannas 
Field burning of agricultural residues 
Other 
Waste 
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Solid waste disposal on land 
Wastewater handling 
Waste incineration 
Other 
Annex B 
Party Quantified emission limitation or 
reduction commitment 
(percentage of base year or period) 
Australia 108 
Austria 92 
Belgium 92 
Bulgaria* 92 
Canada 94 
Croatia* 95 
Czech Republic* 92 
Denmark 92 
Estonia* 92 
European Community 92 
Finland 92 
France 92 
Germany 92 
Greece 92 
Hungary* 94 
Iceland 110 
Ireland 92 
Italy 92 
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Japan 94 
Latvia* 92 
Liechtenstein 92 
Lithuania* 92 
Luxembourg 92 
Monaco 92 
Netherlands 92 
New Zealand 100 
Norway 101 
Poland* 94 
Portugal 92 
Romania* 92 
Russian Federation* 100 
Slovakia* 92 
Slovenia* 92 
Spain 92 
Sweden 92 
Switzerland 92 
Ukraine* 100 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 92 
United States of America 93 
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. 
- - - - - 
Source: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html 
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Appendix 2 : New Invoice of PPC 
 
  
-80- 
 
 
 
 
 
  -81- 
Appendix 3 : EU ETS Directives 2009 
Source : http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF 
 
 
